We empirically examine the price impact of block trades, in the Saudi Stock Market over the time period of [2005][2006][2007][2008]. Using a unique dataset of intraday data consisting of 2.3 million block buys and 1.9 million block sales, we find an asymmetry in the price impact of block purchases and sales. The asymmetry persists even when we account for the bidask bias in block trades, which is contrary to the previous literature. Overall, our findings suggest that in an emerging market where institutional trading is relatively scarce, market microstructure cannot explain the asymmetry in the price impact of large trades.
Introduction
The proportion of equities traded in blocks has increased substantially in recent years. In 1994, block trades (of 10,000 shares or more) accounted for 55.5% of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) share volume (Madhavan and Chang, 1997) ; now it accounts for over 70%. In the LSE (London Stock Exchange) block trades accounted for mere 5% of total FTSE 100 trading volume in 1984 which reached over 50% in 2005. 1 Institutional trading, predominately made up of block trades, accounts for over 60% of total trading volume in the LSE (Stapledon, 1996) .
Prior empirical research has documented a permanent price impact asymmetry between buyer and seller initiated trades in many equity markets including the NYSE (Holthausen et al,1987 ) NASDAQ (Choe et al,1992) , DJIA, (Frino et al, 2003) , LSE, (Gemmill, 1996 and Gregoriou, 2008) and the Australian stock exchange, (Aitken and Frino, 1996 and Chiyachantana et al, 2004) . The price impact asymmetry between block purchases and sales has been a "Puzzle" over the last three decades. Empirical work (see among others, Holthause et al., 1987 , 1990 , Keim and Madhavan, 1996 , Gemmill, 1996 , Frino et al, 2003 and Gregoriou, 2008 has suggested that stock prices react differently to buy and sell orders. 2 The price continuation following a block purchase and a price reversal following a block sale suggests that block sellers pay a liquidity premium while block buyers do not (Aitken and Frino, 1996) .
The explanation of the asymmetry of the price impact of block trades is that there is more informed trading in purchases then in sales. Chan and Lakonishok (1993) , Keim and 1 The Financial Times, January 2006. 2 Chan and Lakonishok (1993) call the price asymmetry of block trades a "key puzzle". Madhavan (1996) and Saar (2001) among others suggest that the block purchases are based on the arrival of new firm-specific information, whereas block sales are motivated by liquidity and portfolio composition. The decision to sell a block reflects the limited option a trader has among stocks in his/her portfolio, whereas the decision to buy a block indicates a fundamental interest in that particular stock among many stocks in the market.
Frino et al, (2003) and Gregoriou (2008) attribute the price impact asymmetry in block purchases and sales to the bid-ask bias in stock prices.
This paper examines the price impacts of buy and seller initiated block trades on the Saudi Stock Market (SSM) over the time period, 2005-2008 . This is important for a number of reasons. First, to our knowledge this is the first study to investigate the price impact of block trades in an emerging equity market. Emerging markets are of particular interest because a vast majority of mutual funds, investment banks and individuals are investing heavily in emerging markets to diversify risk. This is common given that institutional investment is not very well established in emerging equity markets. Second, the SSM is of particular interest because there have been a large number of structural changes affecting the microstructure of the equity market, as well as the role the exchange plays as a resource allocation mechanism. The major structural change was when the government established the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in 2004. The CMA is a centralised regulatory body that oversees the market regulation and activities of the SSM.
Our empirical findings reaffirm the previous literature by documenting a greater price impact of block purchases then block sales. However, unlike the previous literature we discover that the asymmetry persists even when we account for the bid-ask bias in block trades. Overall, our findings suggest that in an emerging market where institutional trading is relatively scarce, market microstructure cannot explain the asymmetry in the price impact of large trades.
The paper is organized as following. Section 2 provides a detailed description of the Saudi Stock Market. Section 3 illustrates the data and methodology used to implement the empirical analysis. Section 4 documents a price impact asymmetry between block purchases and sales on the Saudi Stock Market. Section 5 empirically examines whether the bid-ask spread can explain the asymmetry between block purchases and sales found in Section 4. Finally, Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
The Saudi Stock Market (SSM)
The SSM is a pure order-driven market where only common stocks are traded with financial derivatives and short selling not allowed in the market. In 2008, individual trading amounted to 92% of all trading volume, implying that institutional trading is negligible in the SSM. Nonetheless, it is an extremely active stock exchange with respect to trading volume and market capitalization compared to other regional equity markets.
3
As we can witness from 
Data and Econometric Methodology
We use high frequency data at one minute time intervals to evaluate the price impact of The following equations represent the three types of price effect used in this study: 
We use the trade classification algorithm established by Lee and Ready (1991) Consistent with prior research, we associate a trade indicator for each trade to indicate the nature of the trade: 1 (buy), −1 (sell), or 0 (undecided). Ask, Bid, and Volume. 6 We analyse 4,221,870 transactions amounting to a value of S.R 8.7 trillion (equivalent to $ 2,32 trillions). The sample is very large comparing to previous studies and it covers all 124 listed companies. The average number of shares per trade is larger for purchases amounting to 29,130 shares whereas the average number of trades for sales is 28,204 shares. Moreover, the average quoted spread defined as the ask price minus the bid price, is slightly higher for purchases (S.R 0.3607) then for sales (S.R 0.3564). On the other hand, the relative spread defined as the ask price minus the bid 6 We follow (Engle and Russell, 1998, and Spierdijk, 2004) 
Price Impact Asymmetry
In Table 3 we formally test whether the magnitude of the price impact of buyer and seller imitated block trades is significantly different. Our test entails a comparison of the mean for the temporary permanent and total price impacts of block purchases and sales. The asymmetry between block purchases and sales reported in the previous literature is transparent when we observe the permanent and total price impact. Block buys have a permanent (total) price impact of 0.49% (0.51%), whereas block sales have a permanent (total) price impact of -0.38 %.(-0.43%). Tests of equality for all three measured price 7 See among others Kyle (1985) , Admati and Pfleiderer, (1988), Subrahmanyam, (1991) .
impacts demonstrate that block purchases have a significantly greater price impact than block sales. The price impact asymmetry gives strong support that the information content of block purchases is higher than block sales. This is because the SSM has few institutional investors and a vast majority of the governmental mutual funds are not active in the market. The mutual funds primarily follow a buy-and-hold investment strategy, implying that the market has more purchases than block sales. The purchase of a large trade in the SSM is perceived as a fundamentally strategic decision, whereas the sale of a large trade is perceived as less strategic decision or liquidity-based decision.
The temporary price impact which is mainly a product of short-run liquidity costs suggests that following a block sale, a reversal in prices is predicted and that the magnitude of price reversal is higher in block sales than block purchases. The higher reversal in the price impact for block sales at 0.04%, suggests that sellers in the SSM pay a liquidity premium that is at least three times the liquidity premium paid by buyers at -0.013%. The best five quotes for the bid and ask prices are transparent in the SSM and trades seem to react to a large block sale before it is executed through discounting the price at -0.42%. Once the block sale has been executed, a price reversal of 0.04% on average is observed. On the other hand, block purchases are executed at a 0.5% premium with a smaller price reversal of -0.01%. Given that the price impact continuation is higher in the block purchases, the results suggest that block buys are more informative than block sells. Our results are consistent with the prior literature. See among others, Chan and Lakonishok (1993) and Keim and Madhavan (1995) .
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]

Price Impacts and the Bid-Ask Spread
There is an emerging literature (Frino et al, 2003 and Gregoriou, 2008 ) that attempts to explain the price impact asymmetry in block purchases and sales by the bid-ask bias in stock prices. This is because when using transaction prices to calculate the price impact of block trades a systematic error occurs. This is due to the fact transaction prices, implicitly, assume an equal probability of a trade to occur at the ask or at the bid price. In order to mitigate this systematic error Frino et al. (2003) and Gregoriou (2008) have computed the price impact of block trades purged of bid-ask bias. This is done by using quote data to calculate price returns where bid prices are used to calculate price returns for the sell trades and ask prices for the buy trades. Frino et al (2003) and Gregoriou (2008) find that the asymmetric price impact of block purchases and sales is diminished in the DJIA and the LSE respectively, when price impacts are purged of bid-ask bias.
Therefore, following this line of literature, we empirically examine whether the price impact asymmetry between block purchases and sales in the Saudi Stock Market, can be explained by the bid-ask bias. Following Lease et al. (1991 ), Frino et al (2003 and Gregoriou (2008) we calculate the order flow ratio, to examine the propensity to trade at the quote. We document the frequency of trading for five classifications; 1) at the bid price indicating a block sell, 2) at ask price indicating a block buy, 3) at the midprice price indicating a matching order, 4) between the midprice and bid prices indicating selling pressure, 5) between midprice price and ask prices indicating buying pressure.
The order flow ratio is calculated for the entire sample using the following formula:
As the order flow ratio approaches 1, it is more likely the trade price is at the bid price, and when it reaches 0, the greater the likelihood that the trade is at the ask price. Table 4 evaluates the percentage of block trades occurring at the ask and bid prices in the Saudi Stock Market over the time period, 2005-2008 . 40% of the block trades take place at the ask prices whereas 37% of trades occur at the bid prices. Moreover, the trades that happen between the midpoint and either the ask or bid prices have similar percentages, 9% and 7% respectively. Given that the number of block purchases are higher, and the distribution of the percentages of trading at the ask and bid price are similar, the propensity to trade at the ask or between the midpoint and ask is more frequent than at the bid price.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
In order to eliminate the bid-ask bias in block purchases and sales, we employ quotes data to calculate block price impacts instead of transaction prices. Ask (bid) prices are used to compute the price impact for block buys (sells). Mean returns purged of bid-ask bias are displayed in Table 5 . We witness that the asymmetry in block purchases and sales seen in Table 3 , remains even when we account for the bid-ask bias in block trade transactions.
However, the asymmetry is reduced in magnitude for all three price impact measures.
[ INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 6.
Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we empirically examine the price impact of block trades, in the Saudi Stock
Market over the time period of [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . Using a unique dataset of intraday data consisting of 2.3 million block buys and 1.9 million block sales, we replicate the asymmetry between block purchases and sales documented in the previous literature.
However, unlike prior research the price impact asymmetry persists even when we encapsulate the biases in block transactions through the existence of the bid-ask spread.
Overall, our findings suggest that in an emerging market where institutional trading is relatively scarce, market microstructure cannot explain the asymmetry in the price impact of large trades.
Our results suggest that bid-ask spreads do not fully incorporate the information asymmetry present within block transactions in emerging equity markets. This implies that the electronic limit order book system may not be the optimal trading mechanism for emerging markets. This is because as mentioned by Benveniste et al (1992) and Snell and Tonks (2003) market makers are superior in resolving information asymmetry than the order book system. Our analysis reveals that emerging markets may require a dealership system to improve the quality of their equity markets. Given the extensive trading in emerging equity markets as a result of international diversification, the empirical findings in this paper cannot be ignored. 
